Files
LlamaCasty/HANDOFF.md
T
gramps b3edc2e42e Drop the redundant force-ssl scope, and reject the playlistItems "fix"
force-ssl is gone from the requested scope. Its grant ("see, edit, and
permanently delete your videos, ratings, comments and captions") is a strict
subset of auth/youtube's ("Manage your YouTube account"), and Google's own
liveBroadcasts.insert reference lists auth/youtube as an accepted ALTERNATIVE
to force-ssl, so every endpoint this app calls — channels, liveBroadcasts,
liveStreams, liveChat, playlistItems — is covered by the one we keep. Two
consent lines became one, and one fewer scope to justify. Removing a scope
cannot narrow capability when the scope being kept is the broader of the two,
and there is no forced re-consent: a refresh token keeps the scopes it was
originally granted, so existing sessions are untouched.

The playlistItems change is NOT being made, and the map entry recommending it
was wrong. It came out of the verification hunt on the theory that public data
should not ride on user credentials. Walking the code kills it: ChannelStats-
Service is built with one HttpClient, and channels?mine=true on the same
service genuinely needs the session. Splitting it means a second unauthenticated
client PLUS a Google API key, since every YouTube Data API request needs a
credential and the call 403s without one. So the fix would ship a new
extractable, quota-abusable credential inside the binary to replace a token the
app already holds, buying zero verification-surface reduction (the data is
public, no scope involved) and zero correctness. Strictly worse. Recorded as a
do-not-do so it is not "helpfully" reintroduced later.

Test: ExactlyOneScopeIsRequested_AndItIsTheBroadOne asserts on the const's
parsed VALUE rather than scanning the file — a file-wide DoesNotContain
fails on the doc comment that names force-ssl to explain its removal, which is
the same trap I hit and documented earlier today in the locator test. Suite
380/380, 0 warnings.
2026-09-28 09:45:35 -07:00

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# HANDOFF — current state
**Branch:** `main` (pre-1.0, no feature branches — creator ruling 2026-08-24).
**Last pushed:** `e7cded6` (pricing/Store fee docs). **Local, unpushed:** `536676f` (recording
filename ms) and the Change Account fix in this unit — ask before pushing.
## 🚨 FIXED 2026-09-27 — "Change Account" no longer signs you out before the browser opens
**Reported as:** *"I clicked on my signed-in account pic, then clicked sign-in to another account. It
opened the browser page to login under a different account and I canceled the request. But when
returned to the app, I see logged out — and should not have happened! Cannot sign-in because the
callback url was not released."* Also reported as hitting **both** running instances.
**Two independent defects, and the second one was masking a race:**
1. **The sign-out ran first.** `ChangeAccountAsync` was `await SignOutYouTubeAsync(); await
SignInAsync();`. `SignOutYouTubeAsync` → `TokenStore.Clear()` → **deletes** `ytLlive.auth`. So the
working account's token was destroyed *before the browser even opened*; cancelling the chooser left
nothing. Now `ChangeAccountAsync` is just `await SignInAsync()` — success overwrites the token via
the `sessionChanged` hook, cancel/failure keeps the current session. No sign-out is needed at all.
2. **The retry couldn't rebind the callback port.** Abandoning the browser gives the app no signal, so
the attempt held `localhost:8765` for its full 5-minute timeout. A new `AuthenticateAsync` now
cancels and awaits the abandoned attempt before binding, **serialised by a `SemaphoreSlim`**
(`_authGate`) — without the gate, the takeover window let a third caller see a free port and race
to bind it, i.e. the takeover reproduced the original failure. My own test caught this.
**The cross-instance claim was NOT the cause** and is still open as a *separate* question: no code path
can sign out a second instance (`TokenStore` is per-`InstanceProfile.DataRoot`, `Clear()` is a local
file delete with no server-side revoke, and no second instance had a token at inspection time). Verify
both processes carried distinct `YTLIVE_INSTANCE` values and ran Debug builds before chasing it.
Test: `YouTubeAuthServiceTests.RetryingAfterAnAbandonedAttempt_ReleasesTheCallbackPort`. Full suite
**370/370**, 0 warnings (build `ytLive.Tests.csproj`, not just the app project, or VSTest runs a stale
test DLL). Added an `openBrowser` ctor seam to `YouTubeAuthService` so tests never launch a real
browser. **Coverage gap:** the *ordering* fix (defect 1) has no automated test — `_youtubeAuth` is
hardcoded in `MainViewModel` and `ChangeAccountAsync` is private, so a real test would shell out to
the browser. Wiring an auth seam into `MainViewModel` is a deliberate follow-up, not a bug-fix extra.
## 🗄 PARKED — Google OAuth verification: attempted, hit a Google-side bug, tabled by ruling
**Creator ruling: unimportant for where we currently sit.** Verification is *not* a live blocker and
**must not be re-attempted, re-derived, or re-researched** without a new ruling. The 2026-09-27 entry
that preceded this one wrongly sat at `⏭ NEXT STEP` and framed it as the top priority — that was the
plan going in, not the outcome, and the outcome was never written down. Corrected 2026-09-28.
**What happened:** the verification attempt was made and failed on a bug **on Google's side** — not
something we can fix, work around, or retry our way past. ⛔ **The exact mechanism was never recorded
and is deliberately left blank** rather than reconstructed from memory: a confidently wrong note here
is worse than none, because the next session would trust it. Do not go looking for the cause.
**Owning account (creator-confirmed): `llamachile.shop@gmail.com` ("gramps").** Cloud project number
`198374416003` (from the ClientId) — banked in `ai.md:233`, **do not re-hunt it.** The one-hop console
link is `https://console.cloud.google.com/apis/credentials?project=198374416003` (picker defaults to
**"Recent"** — switch to **"All"**). ⛔ Not the same account as the YouTube channel signed into the app.
**What tabling costs, stated honestly:** if the consent screen is still in **Testing**, the 100-user
cap and the **7-day refresh-token expiry** both stand — that expiry is why the creator kept having to
re-consent. Parking verification does not fix that; it accepts it for the solo-use phase. It becomes
real work the moment a *second real user* needs to sign in, or at Store submission (TASK 48). The
sensitive-vs-restricted classification was never read and is moot until then.
**One of these two survives the tabling, and the other was a bad idea (corrected 2026-09-28):**
- ✅ **DONE — `Services/YouTubeAuthService.cs` no longer requests `auth/youtube.force-ssl`.**
It is **redundant**: its grant is *"see, edit, and permanently delete your YouTube videos,
ratings, comments and captions"*, a strict subset of `auth/youtube`'s *"Manage your YouTube
account"*, which is the scope we keep. Google's own `liveBroadcasts.insert` reference lists
`auth/youtube` as an accepted **alternative** to `force-ssl`, so every endpoint this app calls
(`channels`, `liveBroadcasts`, `liveStreams`, `liveChat`, `playlistItems`) is covered.
Two consent lines became one. **No forced re-consent** — a refresh token keeps the scopes it
was originally granted, so existing sessions are untouched; the reduced set applies at the
next fresh sign-in. Removing a scope cannot narrow capability when the one kept is broader.
- ❌ **NOT doing this, and the earlier note recommending it was wrong: moving
`playlistItems.list` off the user's session token.** It was written during the verification
hunt on the theory that "public data should not ride on user credentials". Walking the code
kills it: `ChannelStatsService` is built as `new ChannelStatsService(_youtubeAuth)` with **one**
`HttpClient`, and `channels?mine=true` (same service) **genuinely needs the session**. To split
it you would need a second unauthenticated client **plus a Google API key**, because every
YouTube Data API request needs a credential — without a key the call 403s. So the "fix" means
**shipping a new extractable credential in the binary, subject to quota abuse, to replace a
token the app already holds.** It buys **zero** verification-surface reduction (the data is
public; no scope is involved) and zero correctness. Strictly worse. ⛔ Do not "fix" this later
without a new ruling.
## ✅ DECIDED 2026-09-27 — pricing: `$10/mo` subscription, or `$400` lifetime, **no annual**
**Creator's ruling, verbatim: *"Let's just go with $10 monthly recurring subscription for option
A and, for option B, a lifetime sub for $400. No annual."* ⛔ **No `.99` prices** (earlier
ruling: *"Let's stop with the x.99 stuff - I find that irritating. Just say: ten bucks a
month"*). This **supersedes** the 2026-09-21 one-time `$29 → $49` model and the old `$99/yr`
sub. No feature gating: free gets everything, the branding flash is the only paid delta.
**✅ Store revenue share VERIFIED — 15%, and subscriptions are NOT penalised.** Read from the
ADA v8.10 PDF itself (downloaded, text-extracted — not a search excerpt). §6(b)(i) charges
**15%** on "any Apps (and any In-App Products in such Apps) that are **not listed in Section
6(b)(iii)**"; 12% is Games-only; 30% covers Xbox console apps/games, Xbox non-subscription
IAP, and Windows 8/Phone 8. LlamaCasty is a Windows PC App — not a Game, not Xbox, not Win8 —
so **6(b)(i) governs both tiers.** The agreement's own changelog (**v8.0, Oct 26 2017**) says
it outright: *"implement the **85/15 revenue share for non-Game subscriptions**."*
⇒ **`$10/mo` nets `$8.50/mo` (~$102/yr). `$400` lifetime nets `$340`.** Also confirmed: the
15% applies *after* VAT/GST (Net Receipts), payouts are monthly above a **$50** threshold, and
no better small-indie rate was found in the standard terms.
**⛔ Two obligations §6(h) attaches to the recurring tier** (why lifetime is the hedge):
(1) we must **fulfil the subscription for the entire period as marketed**, and on breach
Microsoft may refund the customer *"the full amount, plus taxes... in Microsoft's sole
discretion"*; (2) **raising the price disables auto-renew** — so `$10` is effectively locked
for the product's life absent Microsoft's price-change process.
**⏳ Still open:** the `$50` subscriber→lifetime upgrade-discount SKU was discussed and is
**not approved** — do not declare it. Individual vs Company Partner Center account still
unanswered (get it right before enrolling).
## ✅ DECIDED 2026-09-27 — distribution is the Microsoft Store: MSIX + Store IAP
**Creator's criteria, verbatim: "zero headaches, minimal maintenance (for me) while still
providing accountability and a reasonably easy upgrade flow."** Route A is the only option
where all four are solved by handing the work to Microsoft rather than to a certificate
vendor: **$0/yr, no certificate, no HSM, no annual renewal, no SmartScreen ramp**, plus Store
auto-update, Store-side payments/entitlements/refunds/support, and Microsoft review as the
accountability layer. The rejected options and their reasons are in
`TASKS/research-store-certification.md` §3 — **read that before reopening the question, not
before re-deriving it.**
**The big consequence: the whole licensing backend is deleted.** `PolarLicenseService`,
`PolarLicense`, `MainViewModel.License.cs` (`PremiumUrl`, customer portal, the
`OfflineGracePeriod = 14 days` subscription-era artifact, renewal/lapse copy) and the wrong
"Polar unlocks alerts" string all become dead code. `IsPremium` comes from the **Store
entitlement** instead of an HTTP call — which also deletes the entire "network flaky → app
thinks I'm expired" bug class. **Velopack, the update URL and the DO droplet go too.**
**What does not change: the entitlement.** Free gets everything; the branding flash stays the
ONLY paid delta. Store IAP changes how `IsPremium` is *obtained*, never what it *gates*.
**⛔ The old "still open: the price" note is retired — the price is settled, see the top of
this file.** The old "~$69 floor" and "don't break the launch-price promise" notes refer to
the old Polar storefront and are **not** current.
### ✅ DONE 2026-09-28 — TASK 48 item 1: bundle ffmpeg (was the "first code unit")
The app no longer downloads an executable at runtime. `scripts/fetch-ffmpeg.sh` populates a
gitignored `ffmpeg/` from a **SHA-256-verified** pinned month-end BtbN artifact; `ytLive.csproj`
copies it to output *and publish* and **fails the build** if it's missing; `FfmpegLocator` lost its
downloader, its zip extraction and the `%APPDATA%\ytLlive\tools` cache, and now resolves
**bundle → PATH** with a loud, actionable failure. The pin that 404'd is gone, so the
2026-09-01 failure class cannot recur. Suite **379/379**, 0 warnings; 16 locator facts including an
integration test that **executes the bundled binary** (which is what proves the sibling DLLs
resolve). `THIRD-PARTY-NOTICES.txt` corrected — it still named the *stale* tag
`autobuild-2026-08-09-13-03`, i.e. the one that 404'd.
**Fresh-clone cost, deliberately accepted:** `./scripts/fetch-ffmpeg.sh` once (~65 MB). 135 MB of
DLLs in git would tax every commit on this 9p tree; the URL + SHA-256 are the audit trail.
**Answering "other 3p binaries needing bundling?" — no, verified.** ffmpeg was the only
download-and-execute. `e_sqlite3.dll` + `WebView2Loader.dll` already ship via NuGet
(`runtimes\win-x64\native\`), OpenH264 is compiled *into* `avcodec-63.dll`, the rest are managed.
Two gaps remain that bundling cannot fix, and they are the next real risks: the **WebView2 Evergreen
runtime** is a machine prerequisite (item 2's manifest dependency + a graceful-failure path), and
**Velopack's updater downloads and executes**, so its teardown in step 3 is a compliance action.
### The next code unit: the packaging project + `Package.appxmanifest` (TASK 48 items 2–3)
Full trust, `webcam`/`microphone`, English only; Velopack deleted. Add the `DefaultRecordFolder()`
comment in the same unit (the mediumIL invariant below becomes load-bearing the moment the manifest
lands). Full-trust writes under a real package identity are still **unverified** — confirm on a
real packaged build before trusting them with recordings.
Carried over from the research unit, still open:
- **⛔ `Distribution.md:318` recommended a $400+/yr EV certificate for a SmartScreen bypass
Microsoft removed in March 2024.** Fixed then — had it shipped, it would have cost
$400+/yr to buy what $150 buys. Now moot anyway (MSIX is signed by Microsoft), but the
lesson in `MyMistakes.md` stands: a policy citation is a claim about **scope**, not just
text.
- **WebView2 Evergreen runtime** is a machine prerequisite the app will hard-fail without. The
manifest needs the framework dependency, and WebView2 init needs a graceful error instead of a
crash. New, found while bundling ffmpeg.
### ⛔ Two invariants that break silently if touched
- **Full trust, or recording breaks.** `DefaultRecordFolder()` writes to Downloads/MyVideos;
that passes through unvirtualized **only** at `mediumIL`. Flip the manifest to
`appContainer` and output vanishes with no error. A comment is owed there **when the
manifest lands** (TASK 48 item 6) — not before.
- **Chat is rendered, never stored.** That non-persistence half is the load-bearing part of
the 11.12 certification answer. No chat history, moderation log, analytics, or crash payload
may be added without re-arguing 11.12 first.
## Landmines
- **Stale fact inside `TASKS.md` (left alone, flagged here per the Scope Lock).** The "1.0 gates"
section asserts "**TASK 36 is now shipped**", but the catalog row 36 reads **☐ Queued** and
`task-36-gold-pass.md` still shows items 1–6 unchecked. The line most likely means *item 2*
(branding flash goes live) shipped at `9761b1d`. **Needs a one-line fix, not a code change** —
flagging rather than fixing because it is not this unit's job.
- **A stale `ytLive.exe` (PID 2544) locked `bin/.../ytLive.exe`** and broke `dotnet run` with
MSB3027. Killed. **If the build fails to copy `ytLive.exe`, check for a running instance first.**
- **`LayerReorderPersistenceTests.RealMouseDrag_OnTheLayerList_PersistsTheReorder` is flaky by
environment** (needs an interactive desktop session; 2 fail / 1 pass in isolation). **Run the
suite with ytLive CLOSED.** Not a regression.
- **`RealAppHost.RunAsync` exists for a reason** — a frame-pump test MUST `await` inside it. A
blocking wait occupies the one shared STA thread and **hangs the whole suite with no output.**
Always background a `vstest` run and poll the log; a foreground piped `vstest` returns nothing
in this shell even on success.
- **`GlobalHotkeys`: two instances registering the SAME global hotkey** — Windows refuses the
second. Left alone deliberately.
- **MSIX writes under a real package identity are unverified.** The docs say full trust passes
user-profile writes through, but confirm on a real packaged build before trusting it with
recordings (TASK 48 item 6).
## Test state
**379/379, 0 warnings, as of the ffmpeg-bundling unit (2026-09-28).** Build the **test** project,
not just the app project, or VSTest runs a stale DLL.
## Uncommitted / untracked
- `ffmpeg/` — the 9 bundled binaries (~135 MB), **gitignored by design**. Populated by
`scripts/fetch-ffmpeg.sh`. Do not commit it.
- `MARCOM.md`, `MONETIZATION.md` — both edited (privacy-copy guard; the Polar-obsolete banner
and the re-opened-price note) and both **gitignored by design** (confidential business
files, `.gitignore:10-11`). They stay local, as intended. Same for `CREDENTIALS.md` —
**never commit those.**
## Next
1. **The packaging project + `Package.appxmanifest`** (TASK 48 items 2–3) — the next code unit.
Full trust, `webcam`/`microphone`, English only; Velopack deleted. Add the
`DefaultRecordFolder()` comment in the same unit, and the WebView2 framework dependency +
graceful-failure path.
2. **Declare the IAP products in Partner Center** — the price is **settled** ($10/mo, $400
lifetime, no annual, 15% verified), so this is unblocked. **Blocks:** the Store listing and the
`OverlayHost.xaml` copy. ⛔ The Individual-vs-Company account question is still unanswered —
get it right before enrolling.
3. **Polar teardown** (TASK 48 item 0) — `PolarLicenseService`, `PolarLicense`,
`MainViewModel.License.cs`, the `OverlayHost.xaml` string, the `csproj`/`App.xaml.cs`
Velopack sites. `IsPremium` ← Store entitlement. **Do this as one unit** — a half-torn-down
licensing path is worse than either end state.
4. **Vertical recording verification** — the compositor tier is proven by
`Render_VerticalTier_Outputs_1080x1920_From_The_Center_Crop`; the *record* path has never
been run. `FramePump.cs:645` flags off-size tiers as a known follow-up.
5. **WACK + certification notes + the privacy policy** (TASK 48 items 4–5) — the policy must
state camera/mic is OS-gated, nothing is retained, and **nothing is fetched at runtime**
(now literally true — the ffmpeg bundle is what makes that sentence defensible).
6. **Post-session efficacy report** — roll up `CurrentHealth` (dropped frames, duration, health
message) when a stream or recording ends. `SessionTeardownTests` is the natural home.
7. **Measure whether the Windows camera toggle gates DShow** — gates all privacy-forward copy
(`MARCOM.md` guard). Not a certification risk; a trust risk.
8. **TASK 36:212 stale "shipped" line** — one-line fix, needs a hand.
**Dropped from the list** because the ruling made them moot: multi-instance's ffmpeg tools-dir
race (item 1 deleted the tools dir entirely), `scripts/publish.sh` + the `LlamaCasty.exe` rename
(the Store packages and delivers — *revisit only if we ever ship outside the Store*), and the
alert-gating copy (the wrong string dies with the Polar teardown in step 3).
**Everything else in the v1 queue:** stream resilience (32), bandwidth step-down (33), scheduled
streams (34), scene-linked audio (35), the master limiter (12), text source (3.16), reward
events (3.20), the media picker (21), webcam identity (9.5), settings units A/C/D (40), and the
defaults split (37). Ship-checklist items live in `TASKS.md` -> "1.0 gates".